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ABSTRACT: Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the 
penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy ap-
proach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's 
view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism 
(which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's 
approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tap-
penden's account. 
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I   
Imagine that you do not know what to say in front of the sentences ‘John is tall’ and 
‘Joe is tall’ due to the fact that John and Joe are two borderline cases of being tall. You 
can say, then, that these sentences are gappy1; neither true nor false. Imagine now that 
you are confronted with the sentence ‘if John is tall, then Joe is’. As far as you know, 
and having in mind the truth value of its constituents, you would be unable to assign 
any truth value to this second sentence. Hence, it would be also neither true nor false. 
Now imagine that you know that Joe is taller than John. Then, it seems that you 
would say that the previous sentence, ‘if John is tall, then Joe is’, should be true. So, 
which is its truth value? 
 There are two intuitions underlying cases like these. The first one is the truth-
functional intuition: we tend to see sentential connectives as truth functions; the truth 
value of a sentence with a sentential connective should depend on the truth value of 
its parts and this value should be uniform in the sense that, if sentences S1 and S2 have 
the same form and their sentential constituents have the same truth values, then S1 
and S2 should share the same truth value.  
                                                     
* I would like to thank Rosanna Keefe, Dan López de Sa and, especially, José Martínez for all their com-
ments. This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (FPU program 
and Research Project HUM 2006-08236/FISO) and the European Commission’s Seventh Frame-
work Programme FP7/2007-2013 (no. FP7-238128).I am also grateful to the people in the Graduate 
Reading Group of Logos and to the participants of the XII TIF in Girona (especially Pablo Cobre-
ros). 
1 Maybe it would be more natural to call them ‘indeterminate’ but since Tappenden uses this term, as we 
will see, in a non-standard way I prefer to use the expression ‘gappy’ to refer to sentences that are 
neither true nor false. Moreover, since the term ‘indefinite’ is frequently used interchangeably with 
‘indeterminate’, the use of the former would be also inappropriate. 
Sergi OMS 
Theoria 68 (2010): 137-147 
138
 The second intuition is the penumbral intuition: there are sentences that seem al-
most analytic to us and we are strongly inclined to assign truth to them, although, ac-
cording to the truth-functional intuition, they should not have any truth value. One of 
the main authors that has defended explicitly (and elegantly) one approach to vague-
ness that takes into account the truth-functional intuition in front of the penumbral 
one is Jamie Tappenden. Tappenden (1993), following Fine (1975), calls ‘penumbral 
sentences’ sentences like ‘if Joe is taller than John, then, if John is tall, Joe is’. In order 
to see how Tappenden defines the concept of penumbral sentences, we need to see 
first what, according to him, is a pre-analytic sentence.  
 One of the features of vague predicates is that their extensions can vary according 
to circumstances: we can increase in precision a vague predicate (that is, reduce the 
amount of gappiness) if it is necessary in a determinate context. These increases in 
precision are, on the one hand, arbitrary for, usually, when a certain context demands 
sharper boundaries, we can choose them among a certain set of possibilities. But, on 
the other hand, not all increases in precision are equally valid. Tappenden proposes 
one example that will serve as an illustration of that. Suppose we introduce into Eng-
lish the predicate ‘x is tung’ whose use is governed only by these rules: 
 (i) ‘x is tung’ applies to anything of mass greater than 200 Kg. 
 (ii) ‘x is tung’ does not apply to anything of mass less than 100 Kg. 
If we compare this predicate with ‘x is heavy’ we can see, first, that both behave in 
certain respects in the same way but, second, that they differ in a crucial one; the idea 
is that, provided that all our understanding of ‘x is tung’ is given by (i) and (ii), we can 
increase its precision in such a way that, given two objects a and b, b heavier than a 
and both unsettled with respect to the predicate, b counts as non tung while a counts 
as tung. We cannot increase the precision of ‘x is heavy’ in this way; if b is heavier than 
a, then our understanding of the predicate imply that, if a is heavy, so is b. We can say, 
then, that a precisification (a way of precisifying a predicate) is admissible if the 
sharper boundaries drawn are acceptable according to the meaning of the predicate. 
 Now, taking into account that constraints on increases in precisions can be seen as 
assignments of truth values to sentences, the latter example suggests that one of the 
collections of constraints in precision is one whose members can be formulated thus: 
 Never make words w1, ....., wn more precise in such a way that sentence S be-
come  false. 
 Sentences like S in the example are called ‘pre-analytic’ by Tappenden. Hence, if a 
sentence S is pre-analytic then anyone who understands S knows not to draw more 
precise boundaries to any expressions in S in such a way that S would be false in any 
circumstances. An example of a pre-analytic sentence is ‘if Joe is taller than John, then, 
if John is tall, Joe is’. Notice that pre-analytic sentences are never false but, depending 
on the semantic frame, they do not need to be always true. Moreover, Tappenden 
considers the notion of pre-analytic sentence as basic and the notion of admissible 
precisification as derived.  
 Now, what Tappenden calls ‘penumbral sentences’ are pre-analytic sentences that, 
relative to some assignment respecting the truth-functional intuitions are considered 
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neither true nor false, but we are strongly inclined to regard as true. It is this tendency 
to consider penumbral sentences as true what underlies the penumbral intuition. 
II   
We will present, now, Tappenden's gap theory. We will do that in contrast with Su-
pervaluationism; as we will see, the former tries to capture the truth-functional intui-
tion while the latter elaborates the penumbral one.  
 Tappenden uses a partial model, called the ‘pre-assignment’, that assigns to any 
predicate P an extension, that is, a set of objects to which the predicate clearly applies, 
and an anti-extension, that is a set of objects to which the predicate clearly fails to ap-
ply.  
 Tappenden defines satisfaction and falsification of formulas in the pre-assignment 
using the Strong Kleene scheme (that implies that conjunctions, disjunctions and con-
ditionals with gappy constituents are also gappy). A sentence, then, is true if it is true 
in the pre-assignment and false if it is false in the pre-assignment. It can be seen now 
that in an account of vagueness such as this one, the truth-functional intuition plays a 
central role.  
 Supervaluationism bases truth valuation, not upon the pre-assignment, but upon 
the set of admissible ways of precisifying vague predicates in the pre-assignment. Such 
precisifications must be admissible and complete. A precisification is complete when it 
behaves classically; that is, when there are no unsettled cases of the predicates. On the 
other hand, a precisification is admissible when it does not make any member of the 
set of penumbral sentences false; that is, it does not conflict with our intuitions about 
the meaning of the predicates. The supervaluationist claims, then, that a sentence is 
true if, and only if, it is true on all complete admissible precisifications and it is false if, 
and only if, it is false in all complete admissible precisifications. 
 We can see now that penumbral sentences are true under this framework, for they 
are true on all complete admissible precisifications. Thus, in a supervaluationist ac-
count of vagueness the penumbral intuition is fully respected.  
 Now, returning to Tappenden and in order to finish the presentation of his ap-
proach, it is important to notice that, as a matter of fact, it can be seen as a position 
between the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. Let's see why. 
 First, it has to be said that Tappenden uses the supervaluationist machinery we 
have just seen in order to solve the fact that his framework cannot distinguish be-
tween predicates like ‘x is tung’ and ‘x is heavy’; that is, it cannot express how con-
straints on increases in precision are embodied in the meaning of predicates. After all, 
if a and b are borderline cases of the predicates ‘x is tung’ and ‘x is heavy’, and both 
predicates have the same extension and anti-extension, the sentence ‘if a is tung so is 
b’ has the same status as the sentence ‘if a is heavy so is b’ (that is, both are neither 
true nor false). But then, how can we express the intuitive difference in meaning be-
tween the predicates ‘x is tung’ and ‘x is heavy’? The idea seems to be that, when we 
say that two predicates behave in the same way, we do not only mean that they have 
the same extension and anti-extension, but also that it is necessary that, in case they 
need to be sharpened, must be sharpened in the same ways. But that means that, if we 
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want to show that two predicates with the same extension and anti-extension behave 
in different ways, we need to show that they can be sharpened in different ways.  
 Here Tappenden wants to save one of the motivations for Supervaluationism: the 
regimentation of the notion of constraint on increases of precision. He uses then the 
supervaluationist machinery in order to define indeterminate sentences, which are 
those that are true and false depending on the precisification. That means that pen-
umbral sentences are not indeterminate, but have a very special status; they are never 
appropriately called false, they are never false in any precisification2. Nevertheless, 
both penumbral and indeterminate sentences are neither true nor false (I called them 
‘gappy’).  
 That is why it can be said that Tappenden follows a position that can be located 
between the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions; he concedes to the latter 
the special status of the penumbral sentences: 
 [Penumbral sentences] are never appropriately called false. But contra the penumbral  intuition, 
they are not always correctly called true. (Tappenden 1993, p. 569) 
 Thus, the general idea that Tappenden seems to have in mind is the following one. 
Sentences can have two truth values; they can be true (that is, true in the pre-
assignment) or false (false in the pre-assignment). On the other hand, they can lack 
truth value, so that they are neither correctly called true nor correctly called false. 
Now, among sentences that lack truth value we can distinguish indeterminate sen-
tences (if there is an admissible complete precisification where they are true and an 
admissible complete precisification where they are false) and penumbral sentences 
(they are a subset of the pre-analytic sentences and are never false in any complete 
admissible precisification). Although Tappenden's terminology is rather confusing, I 
think this is the best way to make sense of his account. It is important to notice that 
the use of the supervaluationist machinery is necessary if we want to incorporate 
somehow the penumbral intuition.  
III 
Tappenden has to answer an immediate criticism: his approach does not fully respect 
the penumbral intuition. In his account, as we have seen, a sentence like ‘the blob is 
not both red and orange’, where the blob in question is a borderline case of being red 
and being orange, has to lack truth value, even if we are strongly inclined to regard it 
as true. The same happens with our first example; a sentence like ‘if Joe is taller than 
John, then, if John is tall, Joe is’ lacks truth value when Joe and John are borderline 
cases of being tall. Thus, we have to answer the question about the reason why we 
have such a strong intuition. 
                                                     
2 Actually, they are always true in any complete precisification and, since complete precisifications are 
classical, they are never false. As a matter of fact, supposing now that there is higher order vagueness 
and generalizing the quantifiers, we could maybe define other kinds of sentences, like for example 
sentences that are true in most of the precisifications (e.g. sentences like ‘a is a borderline case of be-
ing bald or a is not a borderline case of being bald’). 
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 Tappenden offers the following answer. The use of a language in a given popula-
tion is a very complex phenomenon. Hence, it is easy that it degenerates in a confu-
sion of tongues. That explains the necessity of maintaining the stability of the conven-
tions of a language by correcting the linguistic mistakes of other people. And those 
corrections can be made, precisely, using pre-analytic sentences. The idea is that, if 
you hear somebody that, knowing Joe is taller than John, utters ‘John is tall and Joe is 
not’, then you, in order to show her that she has not correctly grasp the use of the 
word ‘tall’ and correct her mistake, will utter ‘look, if Joe is taller that John, then if 
John is tall Joe is’. According to Tappenden, the general pattern of this activity is the 
following one: 
[W]e utter a declarative sentence S in order to induce the withdrawal of a mistaken utterance of 
¬S, [...] by indicating that ¬S is never correctly assertable. (Tappenden 1993, p. 570). 
 Now, since (i) a condition of correctness for a literal assertion of a sentence S is 
that S must be true and (ii) S is false when ¬S is true and, consequently, ¬S is not true 
when S is not false, we can conclude that it is sufficient to show that S is not false in 
order to show the incorrectness of the assertion of ¬S. When a sentence S is used in 
this way to correct a mistaken utterance of ¬S, we say that S has been articulated, not 
asserted. The main difference is that, while assertion implies truth, articulation only 
implies non falsity. Now the idea is that penumbral sentences are typically articulated 
and, therefore, do not need to be true, but only non false. If we sometimes mistakenly 
judge that they can assert something and, hence, that they need to be true, is because 
we are confused about assertion and articulation due to the fact that the behavior by 
which its goals are attained (that is, to say something about the world, and to correct a 
linguistic mistake) is the same; but it is the same by a happy coincidence. So using a 
special speech act, namely articulation, Tappenden can explain the existence of the 
penumbral intuition.3  
 Let's see now two possible objections to Tappenden's view, one of Rosanna Keefe 
and another one of Delia Graff Fara, which I think are not successful. 
 Rosanna Keefe wonders why we could not pragmatically justify a false sentence in 
the same way as Tappenden does. And she continues: 
If I am interested only in preventing assertion or acceptance of false q, and the best way to co- 
mmunicate this is via p because it has the implicature that ¬q, then p  could be a suitable thing to 
assert whatever its truth-value. (Keefe 2000, p. 184, n. 15) 
 Remember, though, that the kind of process that Tappenden seems to have in 
mind is that, provided that if S is not false, ¬S is not true, it is sufficient that S be non 
false to accept that ¬S is not correctly assertable (for a literal assertion of S needs S to 
be true). That is why the sentence used to correct a linguistic mistake in articulation 
must be not false in order to imply that its negation is not true (and, then, make its as-
                                                     
3 It is not clear, though, if there is really room for such confusion in our actual linguistic practice. I will 
not pursue this issue here, though. 
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sertion incorrect). There is no implicature in Tappenden's process; Keefe is describing 
something that is not articulation.4  
 Moreover, when Grice (1975) characterizes the notion of conversational implica-
ture, one of its main features, apart from (i) the presupposition of the observance by 
the speaker of the conversational maxims and (ii) the fact that only the implicature 
makes sense of a supposed blatant failure of a maxim, is that the speaker thinks and 
the hearer is supposed to think that the speaker thinks, that the hearer can be aware of 
the requirement of (ii). Now, in the case that Keefe seems to think of, since the 
maxim to be failed to fulfil is the quality maxim of trying to make the contribution to 
the conversation one that is true, the speaker utters a false sentence and, then, the 
hearer must recognize it to be false and must be capable of being aware of a kind of 
requirement like the one described in (ii) and, only then, an implicature may appear. 
But in Tappenden's account, we do not only fail to recognize that the articulated pre-
analytic sentences should not be called true (and even less we work out condition (ii)); 
we mistakenly judge them to be true, without realizing that they only need to be not 
correctly called false in order to succeed5. We can see, hence, that it is false that the ar-
ticulation of a false sentence could be equally pragmatically justified in the same way 
as Tappenden's. 
 Delia Graff Fara proposes, in Fara (2000, p. 50), some questions that must be an-
swered in front of the Sorites paradox. Let's see, first, one example of this paradox: 
 First premise: a man with no hairs on his head is bald. 
Second premise: if a man with n hairs on his head is bald then a man with n+1 
heads  on his head is bald. 
 Conclusion: therefore, a man with a million hairs on his head is bald. 
 The conclusion is clearly false while the premises seem reasonable and, hence, we 
have a paradox. In Tappenden's account, the inference is not correct because the sec-
ond conditional premise lacks truth value (Tappenden 1993, p. 574) (notice that, 
within the supervaluationist account, this premise is false, for every complete admissi-
ble precisification has a sharp limit and, hence, the inference is also incorrect).  
 According to Fara (2000, p. 79, n. 24) Tappenden cannot answer one of the ques-
tions that this paradox originates, the ‘epistemic question’: if the conditional premise 
of the paradox ∀xy((Fx ∧ Rxy)→Fy) cannot be true, then we should be capable of 
saying which instances are not true; since it seems that we cannot, an explanation is 
required. Tappenden, though, can give an answer to this question for, according to 
him, the instances that are not true are those which lack truth value; that is, the ones 
where either ‘Fx’ or ‘Fy’ lack truth value and that, according to strong Kleene scheme, 
                                                     
4 Maybe I could articulate something that implies S in order to withdraw something equivalent to ¬S, but 
it is not still the same thing that Keefe is talking about. On the other hand, Tappenden could accept 
that because he is not claiming that articulation is the only possible way to maintain the stability of 
languages.  
5 Even more; one of the main features of conversational implicatures is that they can be cancelled but, 
can anything be cancelled in Tappenden's story? 
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the result is neither true nor false; that is, the ones where x or y are borderline cases of 
F (simplifying a bit and supposing that R is not vague)6. But we can know that (at least 
accepting, for simplicity, that there is not higher-order vagueness). So we can know 
which instances are not true: the ones that, due to the lack of truth value of some of 
its constituents, lack truth value. Thus, if we can know which things are borderline 
cases of a given predicate (our own response in front of them tells us that) and we can 
know the semantic rules that govern logical connectives (we know that), we can know 
which instances of the conditional premise are not true7. Hence, we can see that Tap-
penden can answer Fara's epistemic question.  
IV 
Tappenden, on the other hand, criticizes the supervaluationist approach and, indi-
rectly, the necessity of embracing the penumbral intuition. One of the problems for 
the supervaluationist approach is that, in claiming that the conditional premise of the 
Sorites paradox is false, it is committed to the truth of the claim that there is an n such 
that n has a certain property and its successor does not. But there is no such n. And a 
similar thing happens with disjunctions; a disjunction can be true while we are incapa-
ble of saying which disjunct is true. 
 This is one of the main criticisms that Supervaluationism has to face. As Keefe 
(2000) states: 
One striking departure from classical semantics is the way that there are, in Fine's phrase, ‘truth-
value shifts’, where a disjunction is true though there is no answer to  which disjunct is true be-
cause the true disjunct shifts from one to another on different specifications8, or similarly where 
the true instance of an existentially quantified statement shifts. (Keefe 2000, p.181) 
It seems, though, that Supervaluationism can face, at least up to a point, this problem. 
First, since these truth-value shifts do not appear when we remain within clear cases, 
and since we already knew that we had to accept something counter-intuitive (the 
Sorites paradox shows that), we can accept this disadvantage because of its role in the 
whole supervaluationist theory.9 
                                                     
6 To be more precise, according to strong Kleene, the conditional premise will lack truth value (i) when x 
is a clear case and y a borderline case of F, (ii) when x is a borderline case and y a clear counter-case 
or (iii) when both are borderline cases (always supposing that Rxy is not vague and true). 
7 I am ignoring higher-order vagueness throughout the paper. I think that, in general, it is not essential to 
the points that I am discussing. Nevertheless, maybe it is important here; if there were higher-order 
vagueness we could not be capable of deciding whether some objects are borderline cases. But even 
in this situation we would be able to point out most of the non true instances of the conditional 
premise. 
8 Here we say ‘precisifications’. 
9 It is interesting to consider an argument of Dummett (1975) that is aimed to show, independently of the 
supervaluationist machinery, that the law of excluded middle is true even if its components are nei-
ther true nor false. Suppose we have a vague predicate P and an object a which is a borderline case of 
P. According to Dummett, it seems plausible to accept that we can find a predicate Q such that it is 
incompatible with P and such that the sentence ‘a is either P or Q’ is true. Now, since P and Q are in-
compatible, Q implies not P and, hence, whenever ‘a is either P or Q’ is true, ‘a is either P or not P’ is 
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 Second, Supervaluationism can distinguish between the truth of the negation of 
the conditional premise of the Sorites paradox (that is, that there is an n that has a cer-
tain property and its successor does not) and its having a true instance. That can ex-
plain, claims Keefe, our mistaken intuitions. 
 The idea is that when we accept the negation of the conditional premise we are not 
actually accepting the existence of a sharp boundary. The problem is that we get con-
fused between the claim that (i) it is true that, for some n, n has a property and n+1 
does not, and the claim that (ii) for some n, it is true that n has a property and it is 
false that n+1 does. These two claims do not need to have the same truth value; the 
second can be false while the first is true. The confusion is a confusion of the scope of 
the truth predicate; when it appears outside the existential quantifier, the resulting sen-
tence can be true without an instance making it true. Now we can see that in stating 
the above objection we are confusing (i) and (ii). 
 To sum up, the supervaluationist strategy seems to be something like that: we al-
ready knew that weird things were going to happen and, moreover (having in mind ar-
guments like Dummett's or Keefe's) maybe they are not so weird after all. 
 The problems for the supervaluationist, though, do not end here. We have seen 
that the precisifications over which she quantifies in order to evaluate sentences must 
be complete; that means that it is necessary to draw sharp boundaries between the ex-
tension and the anti-extension of vague predicates. Tappenden claims that there are a 
certain kind of predicates, the essentially vague ones, whose understanding implies the 
impossibility of drawing such sharp boundaries. He defines essentially vague predi-
cates in the following way: 
Call a predicate P essentially vague if there is a sequence a1, a2, ....., an, and a relation Q, such that 
a1 is a clear case of P, an is a clear counter-case, for each i < n+1, Qaiai+1 is true, and each instance 
of ‘If Qaiai+1 then (Pai if and only if Pai+1)’ is a local consistency rule. 
Where a local consistency rule is a pre-analytic sentence, that is, according to Tap-
penden,  
[A] sentence which anyone who understands [it] knows not to draw more precise boundaries [to 
P (supposing that Q is not vague)] in such a way that [the sentence] would be false in any circum-
stances. (Tappenden 1993, p. 557) 
That means that there are predicates (essentially vague predicates like ‘x is roughly 
heavy’, ‘x is roughly within walking distance of Barcelona’ or ‘x is roughly a handful of 
sand’) which do not accept complete precisifications in virtue of its meaning.10 
                                                                                                                                       
also true. Using this idea Dummett claims that it is reasonable to say that, for any sentence A involv-
ing vague expressions, and independently of its truth value, the sentence of the form ‘A or not A’ 
may be seen as true. That is why he says: ‘when vague statements are involved, then, we may legiti-
mately assert a disjunctive statement without allowing that there is any determinate answer to the 
question which of the disjuncts is true’ (Dummett 1975, p. 107) Moreover, this argument could 
prompt the suspicion that sentences involving vague predicates behave classically and, hence, it could 
be seen as a reason in favor of any approach (like Supervaluationism) that tries to respect classical 
logic. 
10 Other authors like, for example, Matti Eklund in Eklund (2001), propose similar predicates. 
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 This criticism is very close to one presented by Dummett. He claims that, although 
vagueness somehow invests language with intrinsic incoherence, it is also an essential 
feature of language. Then, the problem with Supervaluationism is that it regards 
vagueness as if it were eliminable and, thus, it does not take vagueness seriously 
enough; it could seem that, according to Supervaluationism, the fact that our language 
is vague is just due to our laziness to make it precise. 
 The supervaluationist can respond that, after all, her theory is a semantic account 
that quantifies over precisifications and that it is this quantification what tries to cap-
ture the meaning of vague predicates, not the individual precisifications. That means 
that it does not matter if it is impossible to use in practice one of the precisifications 
(for example, due to the fact that our language is essentially vague). 
 Nevertheless, the criticism involving essentially vague predicates seems more wor-
rying for Supervaluationism. After all, we need to precisify vague predicates in order 
to evaluate vague sentences; we may do that without committing ourselves to the enti-
ties over which we quantify, but we cannot do that if we are not able to give the rules 
that constraint such precisifications. And that is what happens with predicates whose 
meaning entails a consistency rule; the very meaning of the predicate prevents us from 
drawing sharp boundaries. That means that the set of all complete admissible precisi-
fications is empty and that, consequently, we cannot evaluate any vague sentence (ac-
cording to the supervaluationist definitions, all of them would be true and false). 
 In more detail, the worry is the following one. When we are in front of an essen-
tially vague predicate, we have sentences (local consistency rules) of the form 
∀xy(Rxy→ (Px ↔ Py)) that, in virtue of the meaning of the predicate P cannot be 
false; that is, they are pre-analytic according to Tappenden. Suppose P is ‘x is tall’ (so 
that the predicate is not essentially vague) and that Rxy if and only if y is one millime-
ter taller than x. Then, one of the directions of the biconditional, namely (i) ∀xy(Rxy 
→ (Px → Py)), is clearly pre-analytic. But the other direction, (ii) ∀xy(Rxy→(Py → 
Px)) is not (that is why it can be false within supervaluationist frame). The latter is pre-
analytic, though, if P is ‘x is roughly tall’; that is, (ii) is not false in virtue of the very 
meaning of P. 
 Notice that (ii) is the conditional premise of the Sorites paradox11. And we are 
strongly inclined to consider it as true (if we were not, we would not have a paradox). 
                                                     
11 Here we can notice another feature of Tappenden's account. We saw what Fara claimed was the psy-
chological question in front of the Sorites Paradox: why are we so inclined to accept the conditional 
premise ∀xy((Fx ∧ Rxy)→ Fy) if it is not true? And we saw that articulation allowed Tappenden to 
solve this question; we are confused about articulation (that needs only non falsity) and assertion (that 
needs truth). Now it can be seen that this proposal works only in the case of essentially vague predi-
cates, where the conditional premise is a pre-analytic sentence. That means that Tappenden has to of-
fer another explanation for the case of non essentially vague predicates, where the conditional prem-
ise is indeterminate and, hence, is false under some precisifications; as a matter of fact, he claims that, 
since in most contexts we do not want to draw boundaries sharply enough for the sentence to be 
false, it seems true to us. That is to say, since the sentence is usually not false, it seems true. This 
seems a poor response to me (and even more provided that most of the vague predicates used in our 
language are non essentially vague). Anyway, Tappenden cannot offer a unified account of the Sorites 
paradox. 
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Why? Well, supposing P is a non essentially vague predicate like ‘x is tall’ we would say 
that the very meaning of the predicate P seems to suggest that it is true. But, is not 
precisely that what happens with (ii) when P is an essentially vague predicate like ‘x is 
roughly tall’? The predicates ‘x is tall’ and ‘x is roughly tall’ are certainly different but 
they seem to provide (ii) with the same semantic status; both seem true in virtue of the 
expressions that conform them. 
 What I mean is that, when you look more closely, intuitions are not as strong and 
clear as Tappenden seems to suppose; it is not clear at all in what could consist the 
difference between essentially and non essentially vague predicates and in what sense 
their supposed differences in meaning could prevent sharp boundaries from being 
drawn in the former case and not in the latter. That means that, in the end, Tap-
penden's criticism collapses into Dummett's one; and we have seen that Supervalua-
tionism can respond reasonably to it.  
 Now the supervaluationist must say that (ii) is false even when the predicate is es-
sentially vague; I do not see why that is so hard to accept or, at least, why it is harder 
to accept than the cases where the predicate is non essentially vague; denying (ii) is 
equally weird (if it's weird at all) independently of the degree of vagueness of the 
predicate. 
 I do not see, besides, that the situation changes if we consider precisifications as 
primitive; after all, if we can stipulate, within a great amount of arbitrariness, sharp 
boundaries for the predicate ‘x is tall’ it is not clear why we cannot do the same with 
the predicate ‘x is roughly tall’ (recall that the supervaluationist does not need to 
commit herself to the use in practice of any of the precisifications). Thus, finally, su-
pervaluationists can defend that there are not essentially vague predicates and that 
Tappenden's local consistency rules are not only non pre-analytic, but false.12  
 Hence, if we do not accept the existence of essentially vague predicates, Tap-
penden's view turns out to be a less reasonable theory of vagueness than Supervalua-
tionism; the latter can explain vagueness within classical logic while the former cannot. 
On the other hand, it turns out to be that, if we accept the existence of essentially 
vague predicates, not only the supervaluationist has to face a serious problem, but also 
has Tappenden. 
 Recall that the supervaluationist machinery was essential to Tappenden's approach. 
So if it is true that the set of complete admissible precisifications is empty, Tappenden 
also has a problem for how can he distinguish between the predicates ‘x is roughly 
tung’ and ‘x is roughly heavy’? They behave in very similar ways but, without the su-
pervaluationist machinery, it seems difficult to express the ways in which they differ. 
                                                     
12 Take, for example, the predicate ‘x is roughly tall’, why cannot we precisify this predicate saying that it 
increases the extension of the predicate ‘x is tall’ in, say, three centimeters? The idea is, then, that 
there will be a set of admissible precisifications of the first predicate that will extent the extension of 
the second predicate. That means, of course, that somebody of two meters will be roughly tall; that 
could sound weird, but it does not seem very difficult to give a plausible pragmatic story capable of 
explaining such a weirdness: as Matti Eklund proposes, when we say that Goliath is roughly tall, we 
are flouting the gricean maxim ‘Be specific’, but we are not saying anything untrue (Eklund 2001, p. 
366). 
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Now Tappenden cannot use the set of complete admissible precisifications in order to 
differentiate indeterminate sentences from penumbral sentences and then, how can he 
distinguish them? They are sentences with exactly the same status: neither true nor 
false. Thus Tappenden, in accepting the existence of essentially vague predicates, is re-
futing his own point of view, or at least he is weakening it. 
 Hence, even if we suppose that there are predicates that cannot be sharpened, 
Tappenden's view is, at least, as problematic as Supervaluationism. 
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